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Windows binaries for Hadoop versions
These are built directly from the same git commit used to create the official ASF releases; they are checked out and built on a windows VM which is dedicated purely to testing Hadoop/YARN apps on Windows. It is not a day-to-day used system so is isolated from driveby/email security attacks.
(Garret Wilson)[https://github.com/garretwilson] has implemented a filesystem which can be used as a replacement for the classic FS, without the need for winutils
If this works for you, no need for winutils at all!
I've been too busy with things to work on this for a long time, so I'm grateful for cdarlint to take up this work: cdarlint/winutils.
If you want more current binaries, please go there.
Do note that given some effort it should be possible to avoid the Hadoop file://
classes (Local and RawLocal) to need the hadoop native
libs except in the special case that you are doing file permissions work. If someone wants to do some effort into cutting the need for
these libs on Windows systems just to run Spark & similar locally, file a JIRA on Apache, then a PR against apache/hadoop. Thanks
Someone malicious would need physical access to my office to sign artifacts under my name. If they could do that, they could commit malicious code into Hadoop itself, even signing those commits with the same GPG key. Though they'd need the pin number to unlock the key, which I have to type in whenever the laptop wakes up and I want to sign something. That'd take getting something malicious onto my machine, or sniffing the bluetooth packets from the keyboard to laptop. Were someone to get physical access to my machine, they could probably install a malicous version of git
, one which modified code before the checkin. I don't actually my patches to verify that there's been no tampering, but we do tend to keep an eye on what our peers put in.
The other tactic would have been for a malicious yubikey to end up being delivered by Amazon to my house. I don't have any defences against anyone going to that level of effort.
2017-12 Update That key has been revoked, though it was never actually compromised. Lack of randomness in the prime number generator on the yubikey, hence an emergency cancel session. Not set things up properly again.
Note: Artifacts prior to Hadoop 2.8.0-RC3 [were signed with a different key](https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0xA92454F9174786B4; again, on the ASF key list.
A dedicated Windows Server 2012 VM is used for building and testing Hadoop stack artifacts. It is not used for anything else.
This uses a VS build setup from 2010; compiler and linker version: 16.00.30319.01 for x64
>CL
Microsoft (R) C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version 16.00.30319.01 for x64
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.````
>LINK /VERSION
Microsoft (R) Incremental Linker Version 10.00.30319.01
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Maven 3.3.9 was used; signature checked to be that of Jason@maven.org. While my key list doesn't directly trust that signature, I do trust that of other signatorees:
https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0xC7BF26D0BB617866
C:\Work\hadoop-trunk>mvn --version
Apache Maven 3.3.9 (bb52d8502b132ec0a5a3f4c09453c07478323dc5; 2015-11-10T16:41:47+00:00)
Maven home: C:\apps\maven\bin\..
Java version: 1.8.0_74, vendor: Oracle Corporation
Java home: c:\java\jdk8\jre
Default locale: en_GB, platform encoding: Cp1252
OS name: "windows server 2012 r2", version: "6.3", arch: "amd64", family: "dos"
The build is based on the instructions in Hadoop's BUILDING.TXT
Java 1.8:
>java -version
java version "1.8.0_121"
Java(TM) SE Runtime Environment (build 1.8.0_121-b13)
Java HotSpot(TM) 64-Bit Server VM (build 25.121-b13, mixed mode)
In hadoop-trunk
The version to build is checked out from the declared SHA1 checksum of the release/RC, hopefully moving to signed tags once signing becomes more common there.
The build was executed, relying on the fact that the native-win
profile is automatic on Windows:
mvn clean package -DskipTests -Pdist -Dmaven.javadoc.skip=true
This creates a distribution, with the native binaries under hadoop-dist\target\hadoop-X.Y.Z\bin
set VERSION=hadoop-2.8.3
cd winutils
mkdir %VERSION%
mkdir %VERSION%\bin
cd ..
copy trunk\hadoop-dist\target\%VERSION%\bin winutils\%VERSION%\bin
cd winutils
rm %VERSION%\bin\*.pdb
git add %VERSION%
git commit -m "Windows binaries for %VERSION%"
git push
Create a zip file containing the contents of the winutils\%VERSION%
. This is done on the windows machine to avoid any risk of the windows line-ending files getting modified by git. This isn't committed to git, just copied over to the host VM via the mounted file share.
Pull down the newly added files from github, then sign the binary ones and push the .asc signatures back.
There isn't a way to sign multiple files in gpg2 on the command line, so it's either write a loop in bash or just edit the line and let path completion simplify your life. Here's the list of sign commands:
gpg --armor --detach-sign hadoop.dll
gpg --armor --detach-sign hadoop.exp
gpg --armor --detach-sign hadoop.lib
gpg --armor --detach-sign hadoop.pdb
gpg --armor --detach-sign hdfs.dll
gpg --armor --detach-sign hdfs.exp
gpg --armor --detach-sign hdfs.lib
gpg --armor --detach-sign hdfs.pdb
gpg --armor --detach-sign libwinutils.lib
gpg --armor --detach-sign winutils.exe
gpg --armor --detach-sign winutils.pdb
````
verify the existence of files, then
git add *.asc git status git commit -S -m "sign Hadoop artifacts" git push
Then go to the directory with the zip file and sign that file too
gpg --armor --detach-sign hadoop-2.8.0.zip
```